The Pacific Pivot, U.S. Security Interests, and the Regional Balance of Power

        As U.S. forces in Iraq neared the completion of withdrawal from Iraq in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration announced in a series of speeches and articles its intention to reengage with the Asia Pacific region militarily, economically, and diplomatically.  This shift came to be informally referred to as “the pivot,” although the administration has since tried to rebrand it as a “rebalancing” of U.S. strategic resources in order to avoid giving the impression that Washington is pivoting away from other regions of the world.  According to the Congressional Research Service, the pivot is based on “a conviction that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is being realigned and shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly.”

        At its heart, this conviction stems from an awareness of the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific being brought about by China’s rise.  Obama administration officials have frequently stated that the pivot is not about China, that it encompasses U.S. relations with the region as a whole.  It is true that the U.S. is working to reinvigorate its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia while at the same time developing closer relationships with the region’s emerging powers such as India and Vietnam, but these moves are all informed by China’s growing economic and military power.  The Pacific pivot seeks to ensure continued U.S. strategic primacy in a region whose power dynamics are being fundamentally reshaped by China’s remarkable ascendance.