As U.S. forces in Iraq neared the completion of withdrawal from Iraq in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration announced in a series of speeches and articles its intention to reengage with the Asia Pacific region militarily, economically, and diplomatically. This shift came to be informally referred to as “the pivot,” although the administration has since tried to rebrand it as a “rebalancing” of U.S. strategic resources in order to avoid giving the impression that Washington is pivoting away from other regions of the world. According to the Congressional Research Service, the pivot is based on “a conviction that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is being realigned and shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly.”
At its heart, this conviction stems from an awareness of the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific being brought about by China’s rise. Obama administration officials have frequently stated that the pivot is not about China, that it encompasses U.S. relations with the region as a whole. It is true that the U.S. is working to reinvigorate its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia while at the same time developing closer relationships with the region’s emerging powers such as India and Vietnam, but these moves are all informed by China’s growing economic and military power. The Pacific pivot seeks to ensure continued U.S. strategic primacy in a region whose power dynamics are being fundamentally reshaped by China’s remarkable ascendance.
From a security standpoint, the U.S. seeks to maintain its ability to project military power throughout the Asia Pacific in order to protect its interests and ensure the region’s stability. Because of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Pentagon has been preoccupied by counterinsurgency efforts for most of the last decade. Over this same period, China has engaged in a significant military buildup. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China’s defense budget has quintupled in size since 2000, going from $37 billion at the turn of the century to $171 billion in 2013. This still leaves it at only a fraction of the 2013 U.S. military budget of $618 billion, but China’s military buildup shows little sign of abating. If China’s defense budget continues to grow by its recent average of 7.9 percent, it will reach $250 billion by 2018.
China’s buildup has allowed it to develop potent anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that increasingly threaten the U.S. ability to conduct naval and air operations in the Western Pacific. These include large scale deployments of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of attacking U.S. air bases and naval forces in the region, a growing fleet of Chinese diesel attack submarines that threaten the ability of U.S. carrier battle groups to operate safely in the Western Pacific, and long range integrated air defense systems intended to deny U.S. aircraft access to the skies over the Western Pacific as well as the Chinese mainland in the event of a conflict.
China's Conventional Strike Capabilities (Source: U.S. Department of Defense 2013 report on China's military)
China’s increasing military strength has raised questions about its intentions. Beijing has grown increasingly confrontational with other powers in the region with whom it has territorial disputes, and it has come to embrace a rather expansive view of its national interests. There is real concern among some observers, for instance, that China’s assertiveness toward Japan in pressing its claim of ownership of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea may lead to conflict, one which would require the U.S. to intervene in support of its treaty ally. Similar worries have been prompted by China’s behavior in the Southwest Pacific, where it has territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines and claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea.
On a broader level, many international observers contend that Beijing’s leaders see China as the natural hegemon in the Asia Pacific. They believe that the Chinese leadership sees its country’s ascendance as simply a matter of China returning to its rightful place as the region’s dominant power after the “Century of Humiliation” it suffered at the hands of the West. Ashley Tellis, an expert on Asian security matters at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, articulated this view in a recent monograph: “Today, even before China has completely risen, it is already committed to the objective of enforcing a strict hierarchy in Asia, meaning that Beijing’s position at the top of the continental order is acknowledged and respected by all its neighbors.” This interpretation of Chinese foreign policy is not shared by everyone – and indeed it may strike many as alarmist – but concerns about China’s future intentions by other governments in the Asia Pacific are real enough. The situation was not helped by Yang Jiechi, China’s foreign minister, who said at the 2010 annual meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."
The security components of the U.S. pivot are meant to address the threat of Chinese aggression in a number of ways. First, the U.S.is taking steps to bolster its military strength in the region. The Obama administration has announced plans to increase the percentage of Navy ships in the Asia Pacific from 55 to 60, and it is allocating more air power assets to the region as well. In addition, the Pentagon is pursuing new concepts and hardware that will permit U.S. military forces to defeat China’s impressive A2/AD capabilities. Over the last four years, the Defense Department has embraced a new strategic initiative known as Air-Sea Battle that aims to do exactly that. While the concept is still evolving, it involves increased integration and coordination of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces, enhanced cyber capabilities, greater employment of unmanned aircraft and underwater vehicles, and new long range strike platforms.
Another important security aspect of the Pacific pivot is the ongoing U.S. effort to both improve its security relationships with its treaty allies in the region as well as its newly emerging powers, most notably India and Vietnam. Most of the region’s governments, many of whom have in the past expressed fear that the U.S. will abandon them in the face of China’s growing power, have welcomed the pivot as a sign of U.S. commitment. Indeed, many of the security components of the pivot have been as much about signaling Washington’s determination to stay involved in the region as they have been about strengthening U.S. military capabilities. Perceptions of U.S. intentions and capabilities matter a great deal. Regional governments who doubt U.S. staying power may conclude that they must bandwagon with China, or at least become more accommodating of its demands and preferences. Such a development would greatly undermine U.S. national interests.
To that end, the Obama administration has made it clear that despite planned reductions to the Pentagon’s budget in the coming years, U.S. military strength in the region will be maintained if not enhanced. Speaking to the Australian parliament in November 2011, President Obama stated that “reductions in U.S. defense spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.” During his visit there, the administration announced plans to deploy 2,500 U.S. marines on a rotational basis to Darwin, Australia. Not long afterward, Singapore agreed to host four U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships (again, on a rotational basis). In both cases, the size of the forces being deployed is small. These moves are being undertaken largely because of their symbolic value. They are intended to serve as visible demonstrations to all countries in the Asia Pacific that the U.S. commitment to ensure the security and stability of the region is an enduring one.
It’s unclear at this point what effect these policy changes will have on the region’s strategic balance in the coming years. The shift toward Air-Sea Battle and the concomitant strengthening of relevant U.S. military capabilities could have a significant impact in terms of countering China’s growing military power, and thereby bolster the credibility of the U.S. security presence in the Asia Pacific. Stronger U.S. security relationships in the region are also likely to enhance the U.S. military’s ability to operate effectively with the armed forces of its allies and partners in the event of a crisis and may enhance other governments’ willingness to host U.S. forces under such circumstances.
At the same time, it is essential to remember that the U.S. ultimately seeks a constructive relationship with China, not an adversarial one. Enhancing U.S. military capabilities and strengthening its security architecture in the region are meant to go hand in hand with efforts to incentivize Beijing’s embrace of, and continued participation in, the U.S.-led, rules-based order that has allowed it to emerge and flourish over the last 35 years. Yet it is clear that many in China are convinced that the pivot is a U.S. attempt to contain China. If these perceptions continue to grow, and the U.S.-China relationship becomes confrontational, this will undermine the U.S. goal of promoting regional security and stability. In this sense, there is a real risk that the pivot will, as intended, bolster American military power in the region yet undermine U.S. security in the long run by fueling hostility between the two countries.
At the same time, China’s behavior toward its neighbors in recent years indicates that concerns about future Chinese aggression are not unwarranted. Were Washington to scale back its recent efforts to enhance its security posture in the Asia Pacific in order to avoid antagonizing China, it would leave the U.S. and its allies and partners with fewer options for countering Beijing’s growing assertiveness, and could even encourage China to adopt more aggressive policies. It is worth noting thatwhenPresident Obama explicitly sought to assure Chinese leaders that the U.S. was not opposed to China’s rise shortly after taking office in 2009, China’s military leaders concluded the overture was a sign of U.S. weakness. What followed was an increase in Chinese belligerence toward the other powers in the region.
It is clear, then, that the pivot represents a major conundrum for policymakers in Washington in terms of how to pursue U.S. security interests in the Asia Pacific. It’s a dilemma that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
-- Richard Purcell
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